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Abstract 
There is a widely recognised tendency for people to positively differentiate 
Self from Other. The present paper asks: What counter dynamic constrains 
this othering tendency? A phenomenon, termed identification through 
differentiation is presented in which the positive differentiation of Self from 
Other collapses in a moment of identification. This phenomenon is 
demonstrated and explored using quasi-naturalistic group discussions with 
tourists in India. Three excerpts are analysed. The first demonstrates a 
tourist’s attempt to positively differentiate himself from other tourists. The 
second demonstrates how such an effort can collapse in a moment of 
identification with the previously derogated ‘other’ tourists. The third is used to 
explore how identification through differentiation is complicated by issues of 
self-presentation. The discussion uses concepts from Mead (1934) and 
Ichheiser (1949) in order to theorise about the preconditions, interactional 
mechanisms and wider applicability of the phenomenon. 
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Collapsing Self/Other Positions: Identification through differentiation 
 
From a social psychological perspective, tourists have a peculiar 
identity because they often resist being positioned as tourists. Crick (1989, p. 
307) crystallises this peculiarity by asking: “Why do so many tourists claim 
that they are not tourists themselves and that they dislike and avoid other 
tourists?” The research suggests that tourists prefer to identify themselves as 
“travellers” (Allcock & Young, 2000) or “post-tourists” (Feifer, 1985) while 
simultaneously derogating “tourists” (Prebensen, Larsen & Abelsen, 2003). It 
seems that tourists resist being positioned as tourists because the identity 
position of tourist is spoiled. In the mass media and daily conversation tourists 
are ridiculed as camera-touting dupes (Löfgren, 1999). Given that identities 
are closely related to place (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000), tourists’ identity 
appears problematic by virtue of being out of place: tourists don’t speak the 
language, they are ignorant of local practices and they conflate the authentic 
with the superficial. Accordingly, it is not surprising that people abroad try to 
avoid being positioned as tourists.  
The problem for people on holiday abroad is that, while derogating 
other tourists, they remain tourists themselves and thus potentially members 
of this so-called outgroup. Try as they might to positively differentiate 
themselves from each other, the fact is that most tourists end up engaging in 
similar touristic activities: they take photographs, visit touristic sights, buy 
souvenirs, and attend cultural performances. Thus there are two inter-related 
but opposing tendencies that make tourist identity interesting. On the one 
hand, there are tourists’ attempts to positively differentiate themselves from 
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naïve camera-touting tourist dupes, while on the other, there is the fact that 
these scornful tourists tend to act in fairly similar ways as the derogated ‘other’ 
tourists.  
The present paper focuses upon the tension between these opposing 
tendencies. Specifically, it is concerned with how tourists’ attempts to 
positively differentiate themselves from one another can, due to the similarity 
between tourists’ actions, collapse in a moment of identification with the 
derogated ‘other’ tourists. This collapse is termed identification through 
differentiation and the present paper will introduce, illustrate and theorise this 
phenomenon. 
Othering and the Self 
It has long been observed that people tend to positively differentiate 
themselves and their ingroup from other people and outgroups (Mead, 1934; 
Ichheiser, 1949; Heider, 1958; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and there exists 
historical, naturalistic and experimental evidence for this. 
Historical case studies of the representation of women (de Beauvoir, 
1949/1989) and the Orient (Said, 1978) have clearly demonstrated how the 
representation of the other is deeply entwined with the representation of self. 
For example, according to Said (1978) the representation of the Orient, 
amongst Occidentals, has historically been defined by what the Occident is 
not. Thus the Orient has been portrayed as undeveloped, passive and 
immature while the Occident has been represented as advanced, pro-active 
and mature. Such historical case studies have led to the concept of ‘othering.’ 
According to Wilkinson and Kitzinger (1996, p.8), othering occurs when Self 
represents Other in terms of what Self is not (and in terms of what self does 
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not want to be) in a way that is “self-aggrandizing.” The concept of othering 
has proven popular, and has been used to discuss nationalism (Steedman, 
1995), conflict (Rabinowitz, 2001), and the logic of the mass media (Bishop & 
Jaworski, 2003). A variant of the concept can be found in the psychoanalytic 
concept of projection. Joffe (1999, 2003), for example, has demonstrated how 
the social representation of HIV and risk in general can entail the projection of 
negative attributes to outgroups as a means to allay anxiety. 
The literature on othering is complemented by experimental research 
on the self and social identity. Most theories of the self contain some variant of 
a self-esteem motive (Gecas, 1982), that is, a motivation to maintain a 
positive self-concept by conceptualising self and the social world in self-
affirming ways. This motive is evident, for example, in the self-serving bias 
(Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). At a group level this motivation manifests in 
intergroup bias, which refers to the widespread tendency for people to 
evaluate their own group more favourably than the outgroup (Mackie & Smith, 
1998). According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), this bias 
sustains high ingroup status thereby providing a positive identity for the 
ingroup members and thus satisfying the motivation for positive self-esteem 
(Hogg & Abrams, 1990).  
These literatures on othering, self-esteem and intergroup bias point in 
the same direction: toward a widespread tendency to differentiate ingroup 
from outgroup and Self from Other in such a way as to bolster and protect 
Self. There is a debate about whether this tendency is an inevitable by-
product of relatively fixed modes of cognitive processing or whether it is a 
cultural creation (Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 
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1996). The present paper, however, sidesteps this debate. Accepting that the 
tendency towards positive differentiation is widespread, the present paper 
asks a new question about the limits of this tendency. 
According to Billig (1985, 1987), thinking is based on conflicting 
tendencies, and thus wherever a one-sided tendency has been postulated, it 
can be useful to look for necessary counter dynamics. As a counterpart to the 
psychological process of categorisation, for example, Billig (1985, 1987) 
proposes the complementary process of particularisation. Equally, one could 
argue that Moscovici’s (1976) concept of minority influence is a necessary 
counterpart to majority influence. In this vein, the present paper seeks to 
identify a counter dynamic which constrains people’s tendency to discriminate 
in favour of the self while derogating the other. One could argue theoretically 
that such a counter dynamic must exist because otherwise we would inhabit a 
world of radically polarised identities and representations of the other would 
be little more than self-aggrandising hallucinations.  
The counter dynamic proposed in the present paper is termed 
identification through differentiation. In this process, exaggerated attempts at 
differentiating oneself from others can cause a collapse of the emphasised 
difference and result in identification. In identification through differentiation, 
the negative attributes initially attributed to the other or the outgroup are, at 
least temporarily, attributed to self and the ingroup.  
To conceptualise identification through differentiation, I take a cultural 
psychological approach (Valsiner, 2004), originating in the work of Mead and 
Vygotsky (Gillespie, 2005). This approach assumes that individuals are 
embedded in cultural streams of meaning, such as social representations 
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(Howarth, 2006) and symbolic resources (Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson 
& Psaltis, 2003).  Identities are conceived to be socially constituted within 
these collectively created streams of meaning (Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). 
Cultural psychology is concerned with the thought and action of individuals 
within these streams, as they negotiate the social world and seek to position 
themselves in the social world. The focus is on understanding thought and 
social interaction as step-by-step time-dependent processes (Valsiner, 2001). 
Methodologically, this approach usually entails qualitative in-depth 
interpretation of situated events. It differs from discourse or conversation 
analysis, in that its concern is with psychological processes such as intentions 
and thoughts, and particularly the cultural constitution of these psychological 
processes. 
The aims of the present paper are firstly to establish and describe the 
phenomenon of identification through differentiation and secondly to offer a 
cultural psychological explanation of the social processes underlying this 
phenomenon. The empirical context for this demonstration and theorisation is 
the identity work of tourists in northern India. 
Method 
The Research Site: “Little Tibet” 
Ladakh, often referred to as “Little Tibet,” is a high altitude region of 
Jammu and Kashmir State in northern India. The area is predominantly 
Buddhist and very sparsely populated. It is described in the popular Lonely 
Planet guidebook as “one of India’s most remote regions” (Mayhew, Plunkett, 
Coxall, Saxton & Greenway, 2000, p. 201). Until 1974 Ladakh was closed to 
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tourists and some areas remain off-limits to tourists today. Since opening to 
tourists, however, the area has received a steady stream of visitors intent on 
trekking in the Himalaya and touring traditional Buddhist culture. Tourists 
usually base themselves in the capital, Leh, from which they take trips of one 
to several days to visit the surrounding Buddhist monasteries, mountain peaks 
and remote villages. Despite having a reputation amongst tourists for being 
remote and ‘off the beaten track,’ almost half of Ladakh’s GDP comes from 
tourists (Jina, 1994). Thus, economically Ladakh is more dependent upon 
tourism than the Bahamas, the Maldives or Bermuda.  
Tourists visiting Ladakh are a self-selected group. They have been led 
to Ladakh by a shared representation of the Himalaya as spiritual, traditional, 
exotic and filled with adventure. These tourists share an interest in 
backpacking and going off the beaten track. The tourists I met, who invariably 
came from high-income countries, were generally young adults, either in 
university or pursuing professional careers. They were concerned with the 
rapid modernisation of Ladakh and feared that the Ladakhis would lose their 
traditional culture. These tourists were also reflexively aware of their own 
impact upon Ladakh, and were concerned to minimise this by reducing 
rubbish and supporting local businesses. 
Constructing the Data 
The present analysis is part of a larger study which investigates the 
dynamics of identity in the interaction between tourists and Ladakhis using 
group discussions, interviews and ethnography. Specifically, the present 
analysis utilises three excerpts drawn from 25 group discussions with tourists. 
These discussions were conducted with the intent of constructing quasi-
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naturalistic conversation amongst tourists. The procedure was to approach 
naturally occurring groups of tourists in restaurants and bars in Leh and 
request if they would participate in a discussion on “changes in Ladakh.” With 
the consent of the participants, all the discussions were audio-recorded. All of 
the tourists approached agreed to participate and seemed to welcome the 
distraction. 
The tone of the discussions was informal. In return for participation I 
offered to pay for the participants’ dinner, dessert, beer or coffee. Food and 
especially beer proved to be valuable aids to the facilitation of the kind of 
discourse that normally passes between tourists in the bars and restaurants of 
Leh. The discussions lasted between one and a half and four hours, and the 
topics covered included tourist photography, souvenir shopping, interactions 
with Ladakhis, memorable experiences, surprises, the past and future of 
Ladakh, Ladakhis’ attitudes towards tourists, and the impact of tourism on 
Ladakh. 
The discussions are only quasi-naturalistic because the participants 
were inevitably orienting toward me as a researcher (Farr, 1984). Within 
tourists’ jostling for recognition, for having authentic experiences, and 
experiencing the ‘real’ Ladakh, my experience and knowledge as a researcher 
laid claim to a privileged position. On those occasions when participants learnt 
that I had been to Ladakh several times, that I could speak some basic 
Ladakhi, or that I had Ladakhi friends, then I suspect that my participants’ 
identity as tourist outsiders became salient.  
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Analysis 
The corpus of tourist discussions contains almost 52 hours of group 
discussions. These were analysed in audio format with transcription, 
according to the conventions detailed in Appendix 1, occurring during the 
analysis. The analysis focused solely upon the identity relation between 
tourists. Accordingly, the first stage of the analysis sought to identify instances 
when tourists mobilising the category of ‘tourist’ were engaging in othering, or 
attempting to positively differentiate themselves from other tourists. This 
yielded 70 instances. An analysis of these instances revealed that tourists are 
not simply defining themselves in positive terms vis-à-vis other tourists, but 
there are also moments of identification with the derogated other. The second 
stage of the analysis entailed searching through the 70 instances of othering 
in search of such moments of identification. In total 16 such instances were 
identified.  
The following analysis makes no claims regarding the frequency with 
which identification through differentiation occurs. The aim is simply to 
demonstrate and theorise this phenomenon. Accordingly, the analysis 
considers just three excerpts, each of which has been selected for a different 
reason. The first excerpt has been selected in order to illustrate positive 
differentiation of self from other amongst tourists in Ladakh, and because it 
reveals a contradiction in the way in which tourists represent themselves and 
other tourists. The second excerpt has been selected because it is a 
particularly clear case of identification through differentiation and thus 
exemplifies the phenomenon. The third excerpt has been selected because it 
demonstrates the way in which identification through differentiation is 
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embedded in the social context and thus bound up with issues of self-
presentation. 
Othering Amongst Tourists 
In order to study identities, it has been argued, one needs to consider 
their content (Tajfel, 1984; Duveen, 2001). This advice is particularly apposite 
for the study of identification through differentiation because, as will become 
clear, it depends upon a contradiction between the content of the 
differentiation and the behaviour of Self. The following excerpt, from a middle 
aged Dutch couple, introduces the content of the derogated tourist identity 
position.  
Marten:  We went to the Phyang festival [a religious festival in a 
Buddhist monastery], it was shocking 
AG:   What were you shocked about? 
Marten:  About the tourists 
Karen:  With the short sleeves, and with the cameras 
Marten:  Totally no respect, no respect [ ] in the festival there was 
a man, and a woman breastfeeding, and there was a man 
taking pictures from only [one] meter distance, like on top 
of her, and I said ‘don’t you think this is rude’ 
AG:   You said this! 
Marten:  But he was German, and he did not understand, he 
looked at me like, ‘are you crazy?’ 
 
Marten and Karen report to me, a researcher on tourism, that they found the 
behaviour of “the tourists” at a certain festival “shocking.” “The tourists” are 
derogated because they have “no respect”: they neither wear the appropriate 
dress for a religious festival nor do they treat the Ladakhis with respect when 
they photograph them. Specifically, one of these tourists is reported as taking 
a picture of a Ladakhi woman breastfeeding “from only a meter distance.” The 
narrative implies that Marten and Karen are not like these tourists because 
they have respect – indeed Marten even intervenes on behalf of the 
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breastfeeding woman. Given the vehemence of this othering, one might 
expect that Karen and Marten do not act like these disrespectful tourists. 
However, as the conversation continues it becomes apparent that they have 
engaged in similar actions.  
AG:   What pictures have you taken? 
Marten:  Mostly of landscapes! [laugh] and gompa! [a Buddhist 
monastery] and a few times of people, because at 
Kaltsang, this little town, its more like a truck stop, and we 
were talking to people, and we took a picture with a 
family, and it was different, because they said,  'ok, can 
you take a picture and send,' it was different because - 
Karen:  We had made friends 
Marten:  A bit, for a day or something, it’s, it’s, different 
AG:   Yeah, it’s different when you have a relationship 
Marten:  Yes, em, a bit of a relation, em, also,  
Karen:  (Also when they) 
Marten:  Also of people, em, really sneaky, but em, but em, I’m 
sure they don’t know, but it’s different from shoving such 
a lens in someone’s face from a meter distance  
AG:  But if you were going to photograph people, who would 
you chose to photograph? 
Marten:  The old women, of course, and old men 
AG:   Why? 
Karen:  Because they look nice 
Marten:  Their characteristics [pause] but when you want to take a 
picture of an old woman, try to have a little relation with 
them, not like run through the country and take some 
pictures 
Karen:  And go home 
Marten:  Like Japanese or something 
 
My question, “what pictures have you taken?,” puts both Marten and Karen on 
the spot. They must justify their actions in the light of their earlier criticism of 
tourist photographers. Marten’s laugh suggests a degree of insecurity. Marten 
and Karen confess to taking some photographs of people at Kaltsang, but 
emphasise that that their behaviour is “different” to that of the tourists they 
were previously criticising. The difference, they argue, is that they had formed 
“a relation” with the Ladakhis they photographed.  
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However, examining the excerpt closely reveals a contradiction. In the 
middle of the excerpt Marten adds, with much hesitation, that he has taken 
“really sneaky” photographs. The degree of Marten’s hesitation perhaps 
indicates that he senses the contradiction. He has been differentiating himself 
from other tourists on the basis of having “a relation” with the Ladakhis that he 
photographs, but his “really sneaky” photographs could not entail a substantial 
relationship with his photographic subjects. His actions in these instances 
have been no different from the tourists that he criticises. Indeed, as the 
exchange continues, Marten proceeds to further criticise tourists who don’t 
“have a little relation” and instead “run through the country.” Yet Marten has 
been doing just this. He and his wife Karen were only in Ladakh for a short 
visit, they were taking “sneaky” photographs and moving on. Accordingly, 
when seen from the perspective of another tourist, their actions would position 
them as typical disrespectful camera-touting tourists.  
This contradiction is not unusual and is evident in many of the 
discussions that I had with tourists. What is interesting in the above excerpt, 
however, is how this contradiction remains implicit. If the contradiction 
became explicit then Marten would be forced to identify with the tourists he is 
derogating. Thus Marten’s identity position vis-à-vis other tourists is 
precarious and teeters on the edge of collapse. The following two excerpts 
examine how this self/other boundary can indeed collapse. 
Identification Through Differentiation 
The first example of identification through differentiation comes from a 
conversation I had with three older English tourists. These tourists were 
travelling around Ladakh in a private jeep. I met them in a restaurant-bar in 
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Leh, near their comfortable hotel. When I approached them, with their clutter 
of cameras, bags and sun-cream, I asked Norman, Betty (Norman’s wife) and 
Carol if they would participate in my research on “tourists.” Norman 
interrupted me to explain that they were not “tourists” but “travellers.” Once I 
had explained that “travellers” were also part of my research, and the group 
agreed to participate, I then asked Norman about the difference between 
travellers and tourists. He said: 
Norman:  I think travellers are people who go to a country to 
appreciate the culture, and I think tourists go to a country 
to be voyeurs, in a way, they have nothing to contribute to 
it, they really just want to go as a diversion, they may as 
well go to Blackpool. 
 
When I had initially implied that Norman was a tourist, he resisted. He claimed 
the position of being a “traveller,” and in his explanation of this difference one 
can see how he polarises travellers and tourists on a dimension from 
respectful appreciation to bored voyeurs. “Tourists” are derogated: they have 
nothing to contribute, they are “voyeurs” who just want an entertaining 
distraction. Voyeurs have visual pleasure without getting involved. The idea 
that tourists are voyeurs is quite common and is linked to the close 
association between tourism and photography (Urry, 1990; Gillespie, 2006). 
But Norman, like Marten, occupies a precarious semiotic position: he 
scorns other tourists for being “voyeurs” and positions himself as superior, 
while he fails to see that many of his own actions indicate voyeurism. Given 
the cameras on the table, I asked Norman whether he took photographs. 
AG:   Em, have you taken many photos? 
Betty:  Now be honest! [laugh] 
Norman:  Yes 
AG:   What type of things have you photographed? 
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Norman:  Generally, landscapes and buildings - I’m nervous about 
taking people 
Betty:  Yes, people I find difficult, I find embarrassing 
 
Asking tourists about their photographic practices is taboo, the topic is 
sensitive and the question intrusive. I hesitate (indicated by the ‘em’) when 
broaching this topic fearing that Norman will perceive the question as a 
challenge to his “traveller” identity. Norman’s wife, Betty, blurts out, with a 
nervous laugh, “Now be honest!” indicating that there is something to hide. 
Norman’s answer is short and unelaborated, so I probe. Then both Norman 
and Betty confess to finding it difficult to photograph Ladakhi people, which in 
turn implies that they have, at the very least, been trying to take such 
photographs. Arguably it makes them nervous and embarrassed because 
they feel that this activity does not befit their claims to be different from the 
average camera-touting tourist. They do not dwell upon their own 
photographic behaviour, however, and return to discuss other tourists’ 
voyeurism. But this time, the attempt to positively differentiate self from the 
other collapses. 
Betty:  I think a lot of the time people don’t realise what they are 
looking at [ ] certainly at Key gompa [a Buddhist 
monastery] I got that feeling, there were just lots and lots 
of Westerners there, and all taking photos, you know they 
had tripods and they had videos, and you know, all 
around the performance area 
Carol:  (I could not believe it) 
Betty:  You know they were taking it as, as a colourful 
performance, which it was, but there must be, behind 
that, which we are not aware of, a philosophy that we 
don’t understand [ ] and we are there intruding as 
Westerners intruding with flashing [cameras] 
AG:  But then the question is if we don’t understand what is 
going on [in these festivals] why is it so meaningful, why 
do you take photographs? 
Betty:  Because it’s pretty to look at  
Carol:  Because it’s colourful, it’s different 
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Norman:  It’s totally different to anything we have seen in the past 
[pause] we have all been brought up on the National 
Geographic 
Carol:  We are completely observers, we are not part of it 
Norman:  We don’t know what is going on, I think it’s voyeurism 
 
Betty carries the conversation forward by criticising other tourist 
photographers that she saw at Key gompa. She says, “they” did not 
understand the dance that they were looking at, “they had tripods,” “they had 
videos,” and “they were taking it as, as a colourful performance.” One is 
reminded of Norman’s distinction between tourists and travellers. The 
implication is that Betty and her co-travellers are different from these 
“voyeurs.” However, we know that Betty and Norman are tempted to and do 
indeed try to take photographs of Ladakhis. Thus there arises a contradiction 
between Betty’s self-positioning and her behaviour.  
This contradiction leads to a moment of identification through 
differentiation. The self/other differentiation collapses just after Betty states 
that “they” were taking it as a “colourful performance.” Abruptly, she interrupts 
herself, finding herself in agreement with this point of view, saying “which it 
was.” In this moment, Betty’s description of the orientation of the voyeuristic 
tourists and her own orientation merge. Then we learn that it was not only 
“they” who were “intruding with flashing [cameras],” but “we.” That is to say 
Betty had her own camera in hand.  
The collapse of this attempt at differentiation is evident in the 
subsequent change of pronoun use. The boundary between “they” and “us” 
has collapsed into “we.” It is “we” who are not aware, “we” who don’t 
understand, “we” who are intruding with cameras. The collapse of the 
self/other boundary is continued in the use of “we,” first by me, and then by 
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Norman, who concludes that “we” all have been “brought up on the National 
Geographic.” The implication is that the National Geographic has socialised 
us into a sort of voyeurism, where we search out the visual image of the 
dance, rather than the meaning of the dance. The excerpt ends with Norman 
positioning himself alongside the tourist photographers as a “voyeur” and thus 
collapsing the distinction between “tourists” and “travellers” that he had initially 
insisted upon. The self/other boundary has shifted and derogation has been 
replaced by identification. 
What is the social psychological process that leads Betty to the 
moment of identification? The collapse of self/other positions is preceded by 
Betty describing and derogating the attitude of other tourists to the “colourful 
performance” and it occurs when she interrupts herself to agree with this 
description. At this moment, Betty is in dialogue with herself.  Her utterance is 
reflexive. I suggest this is an instance of what Mead (1936, p. 379; Farr, 1997) 
termed “the peculiar importance of the vocal gesture,” namely the fact that we 
hear ourselves speak in the same way that we hear others speak and thus we 
can converse with ourselves. Betty’s reflexive shift of position is not simply a 
cognitive shift that is subsequently expressed in her utterance, rather the 
audible utterance derogating the ‘other’ tourists is a constitutive part of the 
emergence of identification. Thus I argue that Betty’s movement to 
identification through differentiation cannot be reduced purely to 
intrapsychological mechanisms. The process underlying this change of 
positioning appears to be distributed between central nervous system and the 
auditory modality. The following section will take this argument further, 
Identification through differentiation 
 17
demonstrating how identification through differentiation is also entwined in the 
social interaction. 
Identification Through Differentiation and Self-Presentation 
According to the present Meadian interpretation, identification arising 
through differentiation is not a strategic way of doing things with words (i.e., 
Austin, 1962). In contrast, it is something that words do to people. Such 
instances of identification are unpredictable and catch their speaker 
unawares. Speakers are not, by default, masters of their own utterances, and 
speakers must often struggle to control the words that come out of their 
mouths (Bakhtin, 1981). Although instances of identification through 
differentiation are not strategic, they are often followed by vigorous efforts at 
self-presentation in which the speaker attempts to mediate the audience’s 
interpretation of the emergent identification.  Permitting the collapse of the 
Self/Other boundary would be both to derogate Self and to suggest that 
earlier statements were hypocritical. After-the-fact impression management 
seeks to prevent these negative interpretations. Consider the following 
excerpt from a discussion I had with three British university students. 
Sophie:  [They] Just sat in a café getting absolutely stoned 
Janet:  ’Cos you speak to the Israelis 
Sophie:  (There are lots of Israelis) 
Janet:  You speak to them, and you’re like ‘what have you done 
while you have been here?’ 
Ruth:   ‘Oh we have been in here for two weeks’ 
Janet:  ‘We sat here and we smoked, and then we got a 
motorbike’ [Everyone laughs] 
Ruth:  Yeah! They all think they are out of Easy Rider or 
something [laugh], going around with their long hair 
AG:  It is surprising how many negative comments I hear about 
them 
Sophie:  The thing is, I know it sounds awful, but they are so 
clique-y, em, it’s so difficult to talk to them. 
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Janet:  I mean we still partook in stuff going on there, we just did 
it more limited and we did other stuff as well 
Sophie:  The thing is, I’m sure it’s the same in the Spanish resorts, 
like all the Brits going there, and things like that, it’s just - 
I don’t know 
Ruth:  It is the same, Brits on holiday in Spain are a real 
nightmare, I mean we were in a minority 
 
The conversation begins with the women deriding a group of Israeli tourists 
they had met in a café several days previously and who were smoking 
hashish and “getting absolutely stoned.” Switching into a theatrical mode, 
Janet asks them “what have you done while you have been here?” and she 
replies, on their behalf, “we sat here and we smoked, and then we got a 
motorbike.” The Israelis are derogated for riding ostentatious and noisy 
motorbikes, for having long hair, for imagining that they are in the film Easy 
Rider, and most of all for spending two weeks “just” sitting in the café and 
smoking hashish. The implication is that to travel all the way to India only to 
live in a haze of hashish smoke is superficial and uninteresting. The women 
find their own scorn amusing. Implicitly, these women differentiate themselves 
from this kind of behaviour. However, after a brief silence Janet interjects: “I 
mean we still partook in stuff going on there, we just did it more limited and we 
did other stuff as well.” The first “stuff” here refers to hashish. Thus Janet’s 
critique of the ‘other’ tourists has collapsed. She criticised them for smoking 
hashish, and now she confesses that she and her friends did the same.  
Thus, like Betty, initial over-enthusiastic differentiation of self from the 
scorned other collapses into identification with the other. “They” becomes 
“we.” Again the mechanism seems to depend upon reflexivity in the auditory 
modality because it is only after hearing her own critique that Janet realises 
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that it also applies to herself. Thus again the process of identification appears 
to be distributed into the auditory modality. 
However, unlike Betty, Janet does not passively capitulate to this 
identification with the derogated other. Janet clearly recognises the 
contradiction between smoking hashish and then criticising other tourists for 
doing just this. But she resists the identification by claiming a more subtle 
differentiation. She says that “we just did it in a more limited way” and “we did 
other stuff as well.” These pleas are attempts to reinstitute the self/other 
positions, albeit in a weaker form. The point I want to draw out of this example 
is the way in which Janet’s resistance to the emergent identification appears 
to be bound up with her self-presentation (Goffman, 1959). Having publicly 
positioned herself as opposed to hashish-smoking tourists she then needs to 
differentiate her own hashish smoking from that which she scorns. The 
collapse of the self/other boundary puts Janet in an uncomfortable position. In 
order to remain reasonable she must either alter her critique of the hashish-
smoking tourists or renounce her position of being superior to these tourists. 
The self-presentation strategy that she pursues is to maintain her superior 
position while modifying her critique: it is not smoking hashish per se that she 
criticises but doing this exclusively.  
There is a second and unusual instance of identification through 
differentiation in the above excerpt. It is unusual because this collapse of 
self/other positions enters as a welcome surprise, facilitating self-presentation. 
This second instance is instigated by my uncertain attempt to comment upon 
the participants’ derogation of Israeli tourists by saying, “it is surprising how 
many negative comments I hear about them.” Sophie, who had initially 
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focused the topic on Israelis, realises that she might have created an 
impression of anti-Semitism. She apologetically says, “I know it sounds awful.” 
She then tries to defend her position by describing Israelis as “clique-y.” This 
utterance does little to extricate her from her awkward position, but it does 
trigger a collapse of the self/other positions. In her next utterance, Sophie is 
no longer talking about Israelis. She is now applying the same critique to “the 
Brits” on holiday in Spain. Ruth participates in this blurring of the self/other 
boundary stating “it’s the same with the Brits” and that in Spain “they are a 
real nightmare.” Thus the critique initially directed at “Israelis” returns and is 
directed at “the Brits.” 
Unlike Janet, Sophie and Ruth are not trying to resist the collapse of 
differentiation. Indeed, they felt awkward about their initial derogation of Israeli 
tourists and thus welcome the collapse of this differentiation. By generalising 
their critique so that it is not Israelis in particular who are “clique-y” but any 
group who is in the majority, such as British tourists in some Spanish resorts, 
the women attempt to avoid being positioned as anti-Semitic. Again we are 
dealing with self-presentation after the event. However, while Janet is trying to 
manage the fact that she engaged in similar behaviour to those she criticised, 
Sophie and Ruth are trying to manage the impression created by their claim 
about Israelis which they fear “sounds awful.” In both cases strategising is not 
evident in the spontaneous collapse of self/other positions, but it is evident in 
the post hoc attempts to deal with that collapse. 
Discussion 
Given the widespread tendency for people to distinguish themselves 
positively from others, there must also be various counter dynamics, or 
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limiting factors, which constrain this tendency because otherwise the 
representation of the other would become little more than a self-aggrandising 
hallucination.  The present paper has proposed identification through 
differentiation as a counter dynamic which reins in the tendency to otherise.  
Differentiation can collapse into identification when there is a contradiction 
between a speaker’s utterances and actions which becomes explicit. The 
process by which this occurs, I have argued, is not narrowly cognitive. Rather, 
it is a process which is distributed between the speaker’s cognitive processes, 
the auditory modality and the audience.  
In order to theorise the emergence of identification through 
differentiation the following discussion will address four questions in turn: 
Firstly, what are the preconditions for the collapse of Self/Other positions 
through differentiation? Secondly, by what social psychological process does 
the collapse of positions actually occur? Thirdly, in which social situations, 
beyond tourism, might the drive toward differentiation result in identification? 
And finally, what implications does this phenomenon have for intergroup 
conflict? 
Firstly, a necessary condition for the collapse of Self/Other positions 
through differentiation is an implicit contradiction in the speaker’s actions and 
utterances. One useful way of conceptualising this contradiction is the mote-
beam divergence described by Ichheiser (1949), who is one of the 
uncelebrated ancestors of social psychology (Farr & Moscovici, 1984; 
Rudmin, Trimpop, Kryl & Boski, 1987). Ichheiser (1949, p. 51) describes the 
mote-beam divergence as the tendency to “perceive (and to denounce) in 
others certain characteristics, for example, prejudices, or blind spots, or 
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ideologies, or ethnocentrism, or aggressiveness, which, strangely enough, we 
ignore in ourselves.” The name of this divergence comes from a passage in 
the Bible: 
Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye 
shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured 
to you again. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's 
eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye? Or how wilt 
thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote out of thine eye; and, 
behold, a beam is in thine own eye? (Matthew, 7.1-7.5) 
 
Spotting a splinter in the eye of the other while failing to notice a large beam in 
one’s own eye is a vivid metaphor for what is observed amongst tourists: they 
criticise other tourists for taking photographs and smoking hashish, when they 
themselves have engaged in the same activities. The mote-beam divergence 
is one possible outcome of the self-esteem motive. In order to accentuate the 
difference between Self and Other, people use a more lenient criterion to 
evaluate themselves than they use when evaluating others. The mote-beam 
divergence results when the self-esteem motive leads people to differentiate 
themselves from the other in a way that is hypocritical. 
 If the tendency toward positive differentiation accentuates the mote-
beam divergence, in so doing, it also lays the foundations for a subsequent 
collapse of Self/Other positions. Positive differentiation based upon a mote-
beam divergence can only be successful if the evaluative criteria used to 
evaluate Self and Other are kept separate. Marten provides a good example 
of this. He is able to criticise other tourists for not forming a relationship with 
their photographic subjects, while not using this criteria to evaluate his own 
surreptitious photography.  The more divergent the evaluative criteria used to 
evaluate Self and Other (i.e., the larger the mote-beam divergence) the 
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greater the potential for a collapse of Self/Other positions, and, arguably, the 
more spectacular the results. On the basis of this interpretation, identification 
through differentiation occurs when a mote-beam divergence collapses and 
Self evaluates Self using the same criteria previously used to evaluate Other.  
The second question to ask is, what are the social psychological 
processes that collapse the mote-beam divergence and turn differentiation 
into identification? The present analysis suggests that reflexivity in the 
auditory modality, as described by Mead (1936, p.379), is fundamental. 
According to Mead, speakers do not usually think first and then speak. Rather, 
thinking often occurs in speakers’ responses to their own utterances. People 
are “thinking through the mouth” (Marková, 2003, p. 89). By virtue of being 
able to both speak and hear, people are able to converse with their own 
previous utterances. Betty hears herself describe the attitude of other tourists 
toward the “colourful performance” and then finds herself in agreement with 
this ‘other’ attitude. Janet begins by scorning hashish-smoking tourists, and 
then after hearing herself, interjects that she too “partook in stuff.” Sophie 
criticises Israeli tourists and then recognises that the same critique applies to 
British tourists in Spain. In each case the collapse of Self/Other positions is 
instigated by speakers’ responses to their own utterances. The speaker’s own 
utterance calls out of the speaker a sense of familiarity with the actions that 
they are describing, and that familiarity indicates the point of identification.  
 Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 354), when illustrating the generativity of 
dialogue, pointed out how the utterance of an interlocutor can call out of us 
thoughts that we never knew we possessed.  In cases where differentiation 
leads to identification it seems that it is the speaker’s own utterance which 
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calls out of the speaker a novel thought. The interesting point about this 
analysis is that it displaces identification from being a purely cognitive 
process, and situates it as a distributed and dialogical process that extends 
beyond the human skull in a loop that leaves the mouth and returns through 
the ears.  
 However, the analysis has revealed that the phenomenon of 
identification through differentiation is also distributed across the social 
interaction. Identification through differentiation can be awkward, and often 
brings into play the dynamics of self-presentation. While the speaker is trying 
to use discourse strategically to institute a difference between Self and Other, 
the unfolding discourse has the opposite consequence. Instead of instituting a 
difference, the discourse leads the speaker, and the audience, to recognise a 
point of identification. The speaker stumbles into a web woven by their own 
actions and utterances. But, if the collapse reveals the tenuous control that 
Bakhtin (1981) depicts speakers as having over discourse, then speakers’ 
post hoc attempts to manage the impression created by the collapse 
demonstrate their mastery over discourse. Immediately following the 
emergence of an awkward identification, one can perceive the speaker make 
strategic choices about whether to accept or reject the shift in Self/Other 
positions. The audience, and more specifically, the speaker’s unfolding 
thoughts about the audience’s perception of the speaker, are constitutive in 
turning differentiation into identification, and especially in shaping the 
speaker’s own response to the emergent identification. Thus, to summarise, 
the process by which differentiation collapses into identification must be 
conceptualised as distributed beyond the individual’s cognitive apparatus, to 
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incorporate the dynamics of the auditory modality on the one hand and the 
social dynamics of human interaction on the other hand.  
The third question is, in which domains beyond tourism might the 
concept of identification through differentiation be applicable? It is possible 
that this phenomenon is particularly common amongst tourists because 
people are continually moving into and out of the identity position of tourist 
and this movement creates a mote-beam divergence. Nobody is a tourist all 
the time, most people are tourists some of the time and most tourists are not 
tourists the majority of the time. When not in the social position of being a 
tourist, people may enjoy participating in public discourse that derogates 
tourists. They can amuse themselves with television images of camera-touting 
tourist dupes from the comfort of an armchair. The problem arises when these 
same people go abroad. Then the non-tourist steps into the identity position of 
tourist, and begins to act in typically touristic ways which conflict with the 
previously espoused derogatory representation of tourists. Thus movement 
between social positions could contribute to the creation of mote-beam 
divergences and thus of contexts in which differentiation may frequently 
collapse into identification. Accordingly, the question becomes: Are there 
other contexts in which people move between social positions? 
While much of the research on Self/Other relations and 
ingroup/outgroup categorisations has tended to work with relatively fixed 
identities, it is clear that in society people often move between social positions 
(Gillespie, 2007). Young people become older people, students enter the 
workforce, able-bodied people become disabled, employees become 
managers, healthy people become hospitalised, people change their 
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sexuality, unmarried people become married, married people become 
divorced, employed people become unemployed and unemployed people 
become employed. Drury and Reicher (2000), for example, have pointed out 
that crowd members must become crowd members and participating in 
collective action can lead people to identify with identity positions initially 
rejected. Equally, Smith (1999) has studied how women reposition themselves 
upon becoming mothers. Considered from the present standpoint, it is 
possible that all these movements between identity positions provide fertile 
soil for the creation of mote-beam divergences and their subsequent collapse. 
Indeed, Smith (1999, p.414) quotes a new mother struggling to reconcile her 
previous representation of mothers with her new found identity position of 
being a mother. Within this struggle, one can see the boundary between Self 
(not-mother) and Other (mother) collapse as she reconciles herself to 
becoming the Other from whom she previously differentiated herself. The idea 
is that the phenomenon of identification through differentiation is likely to be 
found in contexts where people, for whatever reasons, have come to occupy 
an identity position from which they previously tried to differentiate 
themselves. While differentiation often takes the form of derogation, it is also 
possible that in certain contexts admiration for Other may collapse into 
identification. Consider, for example, the case of a business executive who 
admires her more senior colleagues and who subsequently finds herself 
promoted to an equivalent position and admired by junior colleagues.  
The final issue to address concerns the contribution of identification 
through differentiation to the study of intergroup conflict. Research has clearly 
documented the processes through which groups in conflict derogate each 
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other (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002). Given that the 
present paper identifies a limiting factor on that widespread tendency, what 
might it contribute to the understanding of how inter-group conflict can be 
reduced? 
From the outset, it is worth observing that intergroup conflict situations 
usually fulfil the precondition for identification through differentiation discussed 
above, namely, they are rife with mote-beam divergences: there are mutual 
accusations of intolerance, mutual derogations, mutual acts of ‘defence’ and 
mutual suffering at the hands of the other. In short, there is a tendency for 
both sides to criticise in the outgroup negative attributes that are overlooked in 
the ingroup. According to the present analysis, the existence of such mote-
beam divergences should provide the foundations for the collapse of 
Self/Other positions. However, whether these positions actually do collapse is 
an empirical question which can only be fully addressed by future research. If 
they collapse only rarely, it would be interesting to investigate what insulates 
speakers from the realisation that activities which they derogate in the 
outgroup have also been carried out by the ingroup.  
Turning to the reduction of intergroup tension, the present analysis 
directs attention to a new issue. In recent decades much research has 
focused upon decategorisation (Bettencourt, Brewer, Rogers-Croak, & Miller, 
1992), recategorisation (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989), and 
multiple categorisations (Hall & Crisp, 2005) as means of reducing intergroup 
tension. All of these approaches try to avoid categorisations that accentuate 
the differences between the ingroup and the outgroup by introducing novel, 
superordinate or more complex categorisations. The present analysis 
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suggests that, under certain conditions, it may also be worthwhile 
emphasising the categorisations that accentuate intergroup differences. The 
appropriate conditions are when these categorisations contain the seeds of 
their own undoing, in a mote-beam divergence. Where mote-beam 
divergences have been identified, in the context of intergroup conflict, then the 
issue becomes one of trying to collapse that differentiation into the experience 
of identification. The present analysis provides some clues as to the contexts 
which might be conducive to turning positive differentiations into 
identifications. Firstly, these differentiations should be expressed verbally, so 
that there is an opportunity for the speaker to react to, and reflect upon, the 
differentiations that they are trying to make. Secondly, if these utterances are 
made in the presence of more neutral interlocutors, then if the Self/Other 
positions do collapse, the norm of being reasonable will be enforced, and the 
speaker will feel the need to modify the Self/Other positions.  
In conclusion, to propose a social psychological process of 
identification through differentiation is not to argue against the existence of 
othering or the tendency to positively differentiate self from the other. The 
dynamic collapse of Self/Other positions is not opposed to the tendency of 
othering but rather is an outcome of that tendency and, moreover, an outcome 
which is a limiting factor on that tendency. People use discourse to positively 
differentiate themselves from one another, but there are times when they lose 
control of their discourse and the spoken words create unanticipated 
meanings and impressions. If the speaker has acted in a similar way to the 
actions they derogate then the speaker risks hearing their own words with a 
familiarity born of experience, thus forcing some degree of identification with 
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the derogated ‘other.’ Moreover, if the speaker perceives their audience to 
also be aware of this contradiction, then they are led, by the norms of social 
interaction, to redefine the Self/Other positions.  
Identification through differentiation 
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Appendix 1 
Transcribing conventions 
(I could not believe it) Round brackets are used to indicate that an 
utterance is overlapping with the previous 
utterance. 
[a Buddhist monastery] Square brackets are used to clarify the text and 
make observations, for example, about participants 
laughing. 
[ ] Empty square brackets signal that material has 
been deleted from the excerpt. 
 
 
 
 
 
